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DOUBT UNDOGMATIZED: 
PYRRHONIAN SCEPTICISM, EPISTEMOLOGICAL EXTERNALISM 
AND THE `METAEPISTEMOLOGICAr CHALLENGE 
DUNCAN PRITCHARD 
University of Stirling 
Abstract 
It has become almost a conventional wisdom to argue that Cartesian scep-
ticism poses a far more radical sceptical threat than its classical Pyrrhonian 
counterpart. Such a view fails to recognise, however, that there is a species 
of sceptical concern that can only plausibly be regarded as captured by the 
Pyrrhonian strategy. For whereas Cartesian scepticism is closely tied to the 
contentious doctrine of epistemological internalism, it is far from obvious 
that Pyrrhonian scepticism bears any such theoretical commitments. It is 
argued here that by viewing the Pyrrhonian style of sceptical argument in 
terms of this contemporary epistemological externalist/internalist distinc-
tion one can gain a new insight into some of the more problematic elements 
of this variety of classical thought and also get a handle on certain contem-
porary worries that have been raised regarding the anti-sceptical efficacy 
of externalist theories of knowledge. 
1. Pyrrhonian versus Cartesian Treatments of Radical 
Scepticism 
It is widely accepted that the sceptical challenge that Descartes poses 
in his Meditations far out-weighs that presented by the classical Pyr-
rhonian scholars, as represented by Sextus Empiricus in attlines of 
Pyrrhonism and Adversus Mathematicos. 1 As Myles Burnyeat has ex-
pressed the point: 
What he [Descartes . ] achieved was to bring about a permanent 
enlargement of our conception of the power and scope of skepti- 
cal doubt, with the result that Hume, for example, lists "Cartesian 
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doubt" as a species of skepticism alongside, and more fundamental 
than, Pyrrhonism [...] This was indeed a transformation of the an-
cient materials, but in a sense quite opposite to that which Descartes 
intended.2 
There is certainly a great deal of truth in this claim, and I shall begin 
by rehearsing the main reasons offered in its favour. 
On one level, the Cartesian doubt is more compelling because of 
its methodological nature. Whereas its classical counterpart was moti-
vated by, broadly speaking, ethical concerns, 3 and therefore was used 
to inspire belief (or rather, non-belief) of a certain sort, Descartes 
conceived of his doubt as a hurdle that any adequate epistemological 
theory must clear. For example, in Outlines of Pyrrhonism, in a section 
entitled 'What is the End of Scepticism?', Sextus Empiricus answers 
the question in hand by asserting that 
[... ] the Sceptic's End is quietude in respect of matters of opinion 
and moderate feeling in respect of things unavoidable. (SE I 19) 4 
Later on he contrasts the "quietude" gained by living the sceptical 
life with the "disquietude" of those who do not suspend judgement: 
For the man who opines that anything is by nature good or bad is for 
ever being disquieted; when he is without the things which he deems 
good he believes himself to be tormented by things naturally bad and 
he pursues after the things which are, he thinks, good; which when 
he has obtained he keeps falling into still more perturbations be-
cause of his irrational and immoderate elation, and in his dread of a 
change of fortune he uses every endeavour to avoid losing the things 
which he deems good. On the other hand, the man who determines 
nothing as to what is naturally good or bad neither shuns nor pur-
sues anything eagerly; and, in consequence, he is unperturbed. (SE 
119) 
Scepticism is thus a means via which one might learn to lead the 
'good' life. 
Contrast this conception of the sceptical project with that offered 
by Descartes, where the goal of his scepticism — his "general demo-
lition of his opinions" — is to secure a "foundation" upon which he 
could establish belief in "the sciences that was stable and likely to 
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last" (AT VII 18-9, CSM II 12).5 Here there is no suggestion that 
scepticism could be an end in itself 6 This move is important since 
it detaches the plausibility of the doubt from the plausibility of a par-
ticular stance adopted by a doubter, in that the sceptical challenge 
is no longer regarded as an argument that is advanced by an embod-
ied sceptical opponent. This has important dialectical consequences. 
Whereas it would constitute an appropriate response to anyone who 
argued for his scepticism (and thus to Pyrrhonian scepticism, so con-
ceived), to simply argue, as it were, ad hominern, against the coher-
ence of the sceptic's position in proposing it (a common form of cri-
tique against classical scepticism7), the same line of attack would not 
(at least not in itself), seriously trouble Cartesian scepticism. After 
all, if one really is presented with an otherwise unobjectionable argu-
ment that leads to sceptical conclusions, is it really much of a retort 
to claim that no one could seriously advance an argument that led to 
such conclusions? 8 Indeed, in understanding the sceptical challenge 
in this instrumental fashion, Descartes pays it the compliment of be 
 broadly speaking, a paradox — a series of claims which, when 
taken independently, are all entirely plausible but which, when set 
side-by-side, lead to a chain of reasoning that has absurd conclu-
sions. And it would, of course, be no response to the proponent of a 
paradox to charge him with absurdity for proposing it since these are, 
putatively at least, intuitions which we all accept. 9 
A second reason that is often cited in support of the claim that 
Cartesian doubt is more radical than Pyrrhonian scepticism is the 
fact that it is directed at all of our beliefs all at once, rather than at 
each of our beliefs in a piecemeal fashion. As Descartes famously 
wrote: 
Suppose we had a basket full of apples and were worried that some of 
them were rotten. How would we proceed? Would we not begin by 
tipping the whole lot out and then pick up and put back only those 
we saw to be sound? (AT VII 481, CSM 11 324) 
 
This element of Cartesian scepticism follows naturally on from the 
first, in that if one regards one's scepticism as part of one's philosoph-
ical position, then it clearly would be incoherent to try to argue for 
one's complete ignorance on a principled basis. In contrast, if one re- 
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gards scepticism as a paradox, then there need be no bar to elucidat-
ing that paradox in a manner that illustrates its utterly devastating 
consequences. As Michael Williams has expressed this conception 
of the relationship between Pyrrhonian and Cartesian radical scepti-
cism: 
It is a commonplace that ancient scepticism had a moral point, that 
scepticism was a way of life, life without the comfort of dogma or 
theoretical conviction; and it is not likely that philosophers intent 
on putting forward a way of living in the world would push their ar-
guments to the point where the very existence of the world became 
a problem. Thus, it is sometimes said, the intentions of the ancient 
sceptics contrast sharply with those of Descartes who, for the first 
time, embeds his sceptical reflection in a project of starkly theoreti-
cal purity and, as a result, is able to follow them to a far more radical 
conclusion. LO  
Indeed, in contrast to Descartes' doubt in this respect, the stan-
dard form that Pyrrhonian scepticism takes does not have the appear-
ance of a sceptical argument at all. Instead, the Pyrrhonian sceptic 
tends to offer dialectical techniques that enable one to create prob-
lems with any particular claim to know that one's opponent may 
make. The 'dogmatic' stance of claiming knowledge with complete 
conviction should, the Pyrrhonians argued, be opposed by offering a 
countervailing argument (isosthenia) which would engender a neutral 
attitude (epoche) and eventually lead to a tranquil and untroubled 
state of mind (ataraxia). 
Consider, for instance, Agrippa's trilemma'. 11 The idea behind 
this trilemma is that any challenge to a claim to knowledge can only 
be responded to in one of three ways: 
I. Refuse to respond, (i.e., make an undefended assumption). 
II. Repeat a claim made earlier in the argument, (i.e., reason in a 
circle). 
III. Keep trying to think of something new to say, (i.e., embark on 
an infinite regress). 
And given that there is no fourth option available, it follows that 
any attempt to justify one's claim to know will either be interminable 
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(as with option III) or terminate in an unsatisfactory way (as with 
options I and II). 
Another possible reason why Pyrrhonian scepticism is limited to 
this piecemeal doubt could be its focus on the relativity of experience. 
Although such relativity may be able to support doubt about par-
ticular beliefs (or at least provide reasons against those beliefs that 
out-weigh the reasons for), it seems insufficient to support the view 
that, in general, experiential knowledge is impossible. After all, it 
is consistent with the supposed sceptical import of such 'relativity' 
that one does derive knowledge from experience in a range of every-
day 'normal' cases, it is just that each particular experience could be 
construed as being one of the 'abnormal' ones. 
Descartes' doubt, in contrast, goes straight to the heart of what 
would constitute epistemic support for our experiential beliefs. Con-
sider, for example, how Descartes' dreaming argument differs from 
that utilised by Sextus Empiricus. As Sextus Empiricus notes: 
Sleeping and waking, too, give rise to different impressions, since we 
do not imagine when awake what we imagine in sleep, nor in sleep 
what we imagine when awake; so that the existence of our impres-
sions is not absolute but relative, being in relation to our sleeping or 
waking condition. (SE I 63) 
Sextus' use of the dreaming argument, unlike that propounded by 
Descartes, merely adduces considerations concerning dreaming as a 
means of reinforcing the idea that experience is relative and there-
fore not necessarily a reliable guide to the nature of reality. 12 In 
Descartes' writings, in contrast, the argument has less to do with the 
relativity of experience than with the fact that we are unable to ad-
duce a definitive criterion — a "sure sign" — that would indicate 
that we are awake and not dreaming. As Descartes puts the matter: 
[... 
 J  I see plainly that there are never any sure signs by means of 
which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep. The re-
sult is that I begin to fell dazed, and this very feeling only reinforces 
the notion that I may be asleep. (AT VII 19, CSM 11 13) 
Since, Descartes argues, there are no features of our experience 
which allow us to definitively distinguish our waking experience from 
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dreaming, it follows that we should suspend all of our sensory judge-
ments, even when they are undertaken in "ideal" circumstances. The 
classical doubt concerning how experience can be 'relative' is thus re-
placed by a more subversive doubt suggesting that we lack grounds 
for believing that experience is any guide to the nature of reality at 
all, no matter what the quality of that experience is. It is important 
to recognise how radical a suggestion this is. If there are no such 
distinguishing features — and if such a distinguishing mark is a pre-
requisite for any belief based on sensory experience being accorded 
a sufficient epistemic sanction — then it would seem to follow that 
no matter how 'reliable' our experience in other respects is, it is still going 
to be of no use to us in forming epistemically sanctioned beliefs. Ac-
cordingly, whereas one could, conceivably at least, meet the classical 
arguments for the 'relativity' of experience by fixati,ng upon paradigm 
(if only hypothetical) cases of experience where there is knowledge 
and then working outwards to the more problematic cases, this would 
be no response to the Cartesian dreaming sceptic since on this view 
there are no such paradigm cases to which one could appeal. Again, 
then, we find Descartes apparently intensifying the disquieting force 
of epistemological scepticism. 
Note that I have identified the break with the classical scepti-
cal argument in this respect with reference to Descartes' use of the 
dreaming argument rather than, as is more usual, the 'malicious de-
mon' argument. 13 It is certainly natural to think that it is only with 
the latter argument that one gets the superlative sceptical threat that 
is held to be so distinctive of the Cartesian method. After all, as 
Descartes himself recognises, the dreaming hypothesis, as opposed to 
the malicious demon hypothesis, is perfectly consistent with the ex-
istence of many things, such as "eyes, head, hands and the body as 
a whole" (AT VII 19, CSM II 13). 14 The latter argument is thus 
essential if one is to make the characteristic Cartesian move of being 
sceptical about even the existence of an external world. Neverthe-
less, although it is correct to say that it is only the malicious demon 
argument that attacks the truth of most of what is believed, both of 
these arguments attack the epistemic status of most of our beliefs (and 
not in a piecemeal fashion either, but en masse). For although dream-
ing does not preclude the truth of many of the propositions which 
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we commonly believe (such as those propositions which concern ob-
jects in an external world), it does preclude our knowledge of those 
propositions. Accordingly, although the malicious demon argument 
is indeed a more radical sceptical hypothesis than the dreaming hy-
pothesis, 15 the dreaming hypothesis still marks a definitive break with 
the classical form of scepticism under consideration here. 16 ' 17 
We have canvassed two main differences between Cartesian and 
Pyrrhonian scepticism. First, that the former, but not the latter, is 
methodologically (rather than ethically) conceived and thus, relat-
edly, is not regarded as advanced by any particular adversary. And, 
second, that the former is directed at all of one's beliefs all at once, 
as opposed to the latter which proceeds on a piecemeal basis and 
which, in a related fashion, consists of a series of techniques- to in-
duce doubt rather than arguments as such. As we shall see, these 
two axes of distinction are intertwined, but I think it best to keep 
them apart for now until we have examined them more closely since, 
as I shall explain below, the manner in which one regards them as 
inter-connected can vary depending upon one's wider epistemologi-
cal prejudices. 
There are, of course, other differences between Pyrrhonian and 
Cartesian scepticism. For example, Cartesian scepticism notoriously 
issues in the demand for complete certainty in our beliefs, 18 as op-
posed to the Pyrrhonian request that we merely adduce grounds for 
our belief that out-weigh the grounds offered by the sceptic against 
our beliefs. Nevertheless, these differences should suffice for our 
purposes since it is on the basis of these distinctions that the con-
ventional wisdom — found, to greater or lesser extents, in the re-
cent work of such writers as, for example, Bernard Williams, Myles 
Burnyeat, and Christopher Hookway 19 — has formed that Carte-
sian scepticism poses the more devastating critique than its classical 
counterpart. 
2. Epistemological Internalism and Cartesian Scepticism 
Despite these obvious ways in which the Cartesian variety of scepti- 
cism can seem to pose the greater threat, there is an important sense 
in which, as I shall now argue, it is Cartesian scepticism that poses 
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the weaker challenge. The reason for this is that, unlike Pyrrhonian 
scepticism, Cartesian scepticism depends for its plausibility upon a 
prior commitment to the doctrine of epistemological internalism. It 
thus follows that, at least on one level, it is Pyrrhonian scepticism 
that makes the most pressing demands on our epistemology since 
these demands will apply even if we abandon the doctrine of epis-
temological internalism. 
Of course, I am not the first to argue that the plausibility of Carte-
sian scepticism depends upon epistemological internalism. 20 The 
distinctive thesis here is not this claim, but rather the two-fold con-
tention that, (i) the plausibility of Pyrrhonian scepticism does not 
depend upon epistemological intemalism, and (ii) that the modern 
sceptical debate can therefore learn from an engagement with this 
age-old adversary. 
For the purposes of this paper, I shall characterise epistemological 
internalism as consisting, at least minimally, in the following thesis: 
1K: A necessary condition of an agent, a's, knowledge of a propo-
sition, 9, is that a has sufficient reflective access to the factors 
that make it such that a knows 9. 
Although lacking in detail, this should certainly be an uncontentious 
way of describing the core elements of the position.' After all, it 
captures the distinctive internalist demand that reflective access to 
the relevant epistemic factors is essential to knowledge whilst evad-
ing the sort of Gettier-type concerns over the sufficiency of such an 
intemalist component of knowledge. Moreover, if we follow conven-
tion in defining externalism as the denial of intemalism (and thus, 
again at least minimally, as the rejection of this thesis), then we can 
allow for the possibility that an externalist account of knowledge 
could still incorporate core internalist insights. One could, for in-
stance, disavow the claim that the kind of reflective access described 
in IK is necessary for knowledge whilst still allowing such reflective 
access to play a pivotal role in one's epistemology. 22  
In order to appreciate the relevance of this doctrine of epistemo-
logical internalism to the distinction between Cartesian and Pyrrho-
nian conceptions of scepticism, we must first look again at how Des-
cartes' motivates his scepticism. Take the dreaming argument, for 
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example, the beginnings of which we saw above. The definitive cri-
terion that Descartes is seeking is clearly characterised such that it is 
reflectively accessible to the agent — that the agent can himself re-
flectively determine that he is not the victim of the sceptical dream-
ing hypothesis. But since this "sure sign" can never be reflectively 
given in experience — because, ex hypothesi, the coherent dreams 
that Descartes is interested in are phenomenologically indistinguish-
able from waking experience — it follows that one could never know 
any of the everyday propositions which one believes the knowledge 
of which would be inconsistent with one's being the victim of such a 
coherent dream. 
One could reconstruct Descartes' argument in this respect in the 
following fashion, where `dreaming*' refers to those coherent dreams 
that are phenomenologically indistinguishable from waking experi-
ence: 
(Dl) If I do know that I am, for instance, sitting here now, then it 
must be false that I am dreaming*. 
Hence: 
(D2) In order to know that I am sitting here now, I must be able to 
know that I am not dreaming*. 
But: 
(D3) I cannot reflectively determine that I am not dreaming*. 
Hence: 
(D4) I cannot know that I am not dreaming*. 
Hence: 
(DC) I cannot know that I am sitting here now. 
Even if one accepts the epistemic principle that drives the crucial 
move from (Dl) to (D2) — the highly intuitive principle that (rough-
ly) if one knows a proposition, then one must be able to know what 
is presupposed in that knowledge23 — this is still only a plausible set 
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of inferences on the assumption of epistemological internalism. The 
problematic move is from (D3) to (D4). Although, on an internalist 
account, it naturally follows from the fact that one is unable to reflec-
tively determine that one is not dreaming* that one thereby cannot 
know that one is not dreaming*, this move is contentious on an ex-
ternalist account. At the very least, the issue of knowledge possession 
will be a further question for the externalist, dependent upon the rel-
evant cognitive mechanisms at work or the subjunctive relationships 
that the subject's beliefs bear to the truth-value of the target propo-
sition in near-by possible worlds. The Cartesian sceptical argument 
thus presupposes epistemological intemalism. 24 ' 25 
3. A Reconfiguration of Pyrrhonian Scepticism 
With this Cartesian dependence on epistemological internalism in 
mind, it is worthwhile reconsidering the nature of the Pyrrhonian 
doubt. Why is it, for example, that the Pyrrhonians did not go for 
the same sort of "sure sign" arguments that Descartes did, especially 
since they had already considered the sceptical hypotheses them-
selves? And, (as we shall see) relatedly, why did they tend to focus 
on claims to know rather than on the possession of knowledge itself? 
I think that one possible answer lies in a lack of commitment to the 
intemalist paradigm. 
Consider the Pyrrhonian focus upon claims to know. Right at the 
beginning of Outlines of Pyrrhonisrn, Sextus Empiricus emphasises a 
crucial difference between, on the one hand, the Dogmatists — who 
"have claimed to have discovered the truth" (SE 3, my italics) — and 
the Academics — who "have asserted that it cannot be apprehended" 
(SE 3, my italics) — and, on the other, the Sceptics who simply "go 
on inquiring" (SE 3). A contrast is thus established between those 
who claim knowledge or the lack of it, and the Pyrrhonian strategy 
of censuring each and every claim to know. 
A natural thought to have is that any attack on an agent's abil-
ity to claim to know a certain proposition is itself, albeit derivatively, 
an attack on the agent's possession of knowledge. This thought de-
pends, however, on the plausibility of the idea that, if one knows 
a proposition, then, ceteris paribus, one can properly claim to know 
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that proposition. Such a principle is itself only convincing, however, 
given an internalist theory of knowledge. Clearly, on whatever epis-
temological view one endorses (whether intemalist or externalist), 
what makes a claim to know legitimate is, (again, ceteris paribus), the 
subject's possession of reflectively accessible grounds to support that 
assertion. As Wittgenstein expressed the matter: 
One says "I know" when one is ready to give compelling grounds. "I 
know" relates to a possibility of demonstrating the tnith.26 
Similar remarks are also to be found in the work of Austin: 
When I say, 'I know', I give others my word: I give others my authority 
for saying that 'S is P'. [... ] 
If you say you know something, the most immediate challenge takes 
the form of asking, 'Are you in a position to know?': that is, you must 
undertake to show not merely that you are sure of it, but that it is 
within your cognisance. 27 
One could put the point by saying that a claim to know carries with it 
a certain conversational implicature to the effect that one is willing, 
and able, to offer adequate grounds (i.e., 'internal' grounds) to sup-
port that claim. If this implicature is false, however, (if one is unable 
to offer such grounds), then that claim to know, whilst it may be true, 
is improper. 28 
Given that the internalist stresses the importance of reflectively 
accessible grounds to knowledge possession, it follows that on the in-
temalist account there will be a very tight connection between the 
ability to properly claim to know a certain proposition, and the pos-
session of knowledge of that proposition. In general, if one knows, 
then one can properly claim that knowledge, and if one can properly 
claim knowledge then (provided what is claimed is true), one knows. 
In contrast, on the externalist picture this tight connection breaks 
down. Although the externalist will agree that a claim to know is 
only in order when one has sufficient reflectively accessible grounds 
to support that claim, he will demur from the converse direction of 
fit. For an extemalist there will be cases in which one knows but 
one is unable to properly claim that knowledge because one lacks 
sufficient reflectively accessible grounds to support that claim. 
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Indeed, such is the point of the cases over which the internal-
ist and the externalist disagree. Whereas extemalists are content 
to allow, say, small children the capacity to know whilst lacking the 
reflective skills demanded by the internalist, they would agree that 
small children cannot properly claim such knowledge. For the exter-
nalist, then (and unlike the intemalist), just as a lack of reflectively 
accessible grounds need not indicate that one does not know, so an 
inability to properly claim knowledge because one lacks reflectively 
accessible grounds need not indicate that one does not know either. 
One might posses a 'brute' externalist form of knowledge whilst being 
completely unable to properly claim that one has it. 
This point is important because it highlights that it is only when 
viewed through the lens of an internalist epistemology that one would 
straightforwardly construe the Pyrrhonian attack on claims to know 
as thereby being attacks on knowledge possession. Viewed through 
the alternative lens of an externalist epistemology the challenge to a 
subject's claims to know can coexist with an acceptance that the sub-
ject may indeed know a great deal. This point has significant dialec-
tical consequences. Since Cartesian scepticism presupposes internal-
ism, it will only defeat one's putative possession of knowledge (and 
thus one's putative ability to properly claim that knowledge), pro-
vided one accepts the internalist paradigm. In contrast, the Pyrrho-
nian censure of claims to know can be construed either as an indi-
rect attack on knowledge possession (if one endorses the internalist 
paradigm), or as merely an attack on one's ability to properly claim 
knowledge (on the extemalist account). In an important sense, then, 
Pyrrhonian scepticism can be understood as stronger than its Carte-
sian counterpart on the grounds that it can be interpreted as posing 
a sceptical challenge whatever type of epistemology, internalist or ex-
ternalist, one endorses. 
Furthermore, on the assumption that the Pyrrhonian sceptical po-
sition is not tied to an internalist epistemology, we now have a com-
pelling explanation of several other interesting features of the Pyrrho-
nian stance. For one thing, we can further account for why it is that 
this variety of scepticism proceeds in a piecemeal fashion. The stan-
dard explanation of this facet of the classical doubt was that such a 
strategy enabled the Pyrrhonian sceptic to evade the charge that he 
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is putting forward the very sort of general epistemological claims that 
his scepticism is supposed to undermine. One might add more flesh 
to this explanation by noting how a general form of doubt along the 
same lines as that proposed by Descartes would, in any case, commit 
the Pyrrhonian sceptic to internalist epistemological principles. Why 
seek a "sure sign" which would reflectively validate one's putative ex-
periential knowledge if one does not endorse internalism? 
By considering the Pyrrhonian challenge in the light of the in-
ternalist/externalist contrast we can also explain certain apparent 
anomalies in the Pyrrhonian position. It was often thought odd, if 
not straightforwardly self-refuting, that the Pyrrhonians claimed to 
endorse such an extravagant doubt whilst going about their lives in a 
normal (albeit "non-dogmatic") fashion. Isn't it impossible to "live" 
one's radical scepticism? 29 Relatedly, how can one understand radi-
cal scepticism as an ethical stance when it seems to preclude one from 
coherently engaging in any enterprise at all, ethical or otherwise? 
There have been a number of proposals put forward to try to ex-
plain this apparent anomaly in the Pyrrhonian position. One popu-
lar thesis in this regard is to make some sort of distinction between 
the 'theoretical' or 'philosophical' beliefs that the Pyrrhonian sceptic 
must be sceptical about, and the `practical' beliefs that can be left as 
they are. This proposal gains support from the fact that Pyrrhonian 
scepticism seems to primarily consist in, as Michael Williams has put 
it, "a distrust of theoretical commitments". 30 Burnyeat has pursued 
a similar point, noting that 
[... I ancient scepticism even at its most extreme did not seriously 
question that one can walk around in the world. It did not seriously 
question this, I have argued, because it was in fact entirely serious 
about carrying skepticism into the practical affairs of life.31 
The ethical nature of the Pyrrhonian doubt is thus only possible be-
cause 'practical' concerns are exempted from the battery of sceptical 
argument. 
By making a distinction of this sort between those theoretical be-
liefs that are open to censure and their quotidian counterparts which 
aren't, one can thus explain why scepticism is `liveable' in the way 
that the sceptic supposes. 32 The problem with this line of thought 
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is that it dramatically weakens the sceptical argument by restricting 
the range of propositions to which it is applicable. Moreover, surely 
the Pyrrhonian sceptical strategy of doubt could be applied to any 
genuine claim to know, even a non-theoretical one made in a `prac-
tical' conversational context? Indeed, the application of Agrippa's 
trilemma, outlined above, does not seem to be restricted in this way 
at all. Prima facie, it can be put to work against any serious claim to 
know. 
Michael Williams tries to evade this concern by distinguishing 
two different epistemological contexts — the context of "reflection" 
in which any claim can be legitimately called into question, and the 
context of "action" in which everyday beliefs are exempted from scep-
tical attack. He writes: 
I think that the only way to resolve this apparent inconsistency [of 
advancing scepticism and assenting to propositions in everyday life] is to 
see the scope of sceptical assent as determined not just by style but 
also by context. What Sextus must mean is that, though anything 
can be questioned, some things ordinarily are not. In the context 
of reflection, where we want to determine what is true, or what can 
justifiably be believed, any opinion can be subjected to the method 
of opposition. But in the context of action, everyday life, all sorts of 
things are simply taken for granted, without argument. 33 
It is difficult to see how this evades the difficulty, however, since the 
problem remains that one can be no less dogmatic in everyday life 
than one is in the context of theoretical speculation. Accordingly, if 
it is the ethical goal of attaining quietude that is at issue, with dogma 
its enemy, then the Pyrrhonian strategy of doubt must be applicable 
in whichever context a dogmatic claim is made, whether theoretical 
or practical. 
Aware of this tension, other commentators have tried to rescue 
the radical nature of the classical doubt within an ethical frame-
work by arguing that one should distinguish between two sorts of 
assent. Michael Frede, for example, has argued that the Pyrrhonians 
merely offered a 'sceptical' rather than a `dogmatic' assent to the be-
liefs (about, primarily, appearances) that they lived their lives by.34 
Relatedly, the point has been made — by David Sedley, Jonathan 
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Barnes, and (a later) Burnyeat et al. 
— that one needs to distinguish 
a more demanding sense of 'dogma' from that of 'belief' . 35 
Certainly, some distinction is needed if we are to rescue the in-
ternal coherence of the Pyrrhonian view. Sextus Empiricus gestures 
towards such a distinction himself, of course, at a number of junc-
tures. For example, he writes 
[W] hen we say that the sceptic refrains from dogmatizing we do not 
use the term "dogma" as some do, in the broader sense of "approval 
of a thing" (for the Sceptic gives assent to the feelings which are 
the necessary results of sense-impressions, and he would not, for ex-
ample, say when feeling hot or cold "I believe that I am not hot or 
cold"); but we say that "he does not dogmatize" using "dogma" in 
the sense, which some give it, of "assent to one of the non-evident 
objects of scientific inquiry" F... ]. (SE I 13-4, cf. SE I 16) 
The use of the term "dogma" here is remarkably close to a more con-
temporary reading in terms of "acceptance", where the latter indi-
cates a voluntary willingness to assent to the proposition in ques-
tion. 36 What is interesting about this notion is that it is completely 
unlike belief in the sense that an agent's acceptance of a proposition, 
P, neither entails, nor is entailed by, that agent's belief that P. 
On the one hand, an agent might involuntarily believe a prowl 
sition even though he would not be voluntarily willing to assent to 
it (and thereby accept it). This would, plausibly, be the case in sce-
narios in which an agent is convinced of a radical sceptical argument 
but continues to form (what we might call 'Humean') beliefs about 
his environment regardless. For example, in such a scenario (as the 
Pyrrhonians acknowledge), one would find oneself assenting (if only 
implicitly) to statements about one's sense-impressions even though 
one did not accept those statements. 
On the other, an agent may accept, and thereby be voluntarily 
willing to assent to, various propositions that he does not in fact be-
lieve. 37 Though the extent to which one can exercise control over 
one's set of beliefs is moot, it is surely agreed by all that one cannot al-
ways changes one's beliefs merely as a matter of fiat. One might thus 
be convinced by an argument, and therefore accept the conclusion 
of that argument, whilst still retaining one's belief in the negation of 
that conclusion. 
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The essential distinction between the two notions is thus one of 
choice. Although one can at least partially capture this distinction in 
terms of a 'practical'/theoretical' contrast — since theoretical beliefs 
tend to be the paradigmatic sort of beliefs that one chooses to assent 
to — the 'voluntary' axis makes a more fine-grained cut. After all, 
as noted above, even practical beliefs, if asserted with conviction, 
can be prone to the sort of techniques of doubt that one finds with 
Agrippa's trilemma.38 
What is significant about those cases in which one spontaneously 
'assents' to a proposition in this way is that such assertions do not 
carry the same sort of weight of conversational implicature than is 
involved in a typical claim to know. For one thing, such spontaneous 
acts of assent are rarely, if ever, prefixed by an epistemic operator, 
and so do not carry the implicatures associated with such 'epistemic' 
claims that we saw above. Indeed, in an important sense, these non-
dogmatic assertions tend to carry no conversational implicatures at 
all since the very fact that they are recognised as being spontaneous 
serves to 'cancel' such implicatures from the outset. For example, 
applying Agrippa's trilemma to such assertions would clearly be im-
proper because the speaker is obviously not intending them to carry 
any sort of conversational burden. They are, if you like, more like 
reports than assertions. 39 
What is also important about this distinction is that it leaves room 
for a notion of belief (however minimal) to play a role within the 
Pyrrhonian framework even once the sceptical argumentation has 
done its job. And where there is even such minimal belief there 
is the potential, at least on the externalist account, for knowledge. 
Moreover, where there is belief there is also the capacity for belief-
guided action, thereby offering an explanation of how it could be that 
this form of classical scepticism was advanced as an ethical position 
that the proponents claimed to be trying to embody. 
Accordingly, this distinction between dogma and belief merely 
serves to emphasise the fact that Pyrrhonian scepticism is entirely 
consistent with an externalist epistemology. It may well be that one 
is so related to the world such that one's beliefs do indeed mesh with 
reality in an appropriate fashion. In this nominal sense one would 
thus have a very 'brute' knowledge of the world borne of this um- 
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ited causal engagement with an external reality. On this reading, 
then, the Pyrrhonian sceptics have no interest in attacking this type 
of 'knowledge', if, indeed, that is what it is. The focus of their attack 
is rather that form of knowledge that can be put to discursive use 
— knowledge that can be claimed, defended, used to convince. It is 
this form of knowledge — a more sophisticated cousin of its weaker 
externalist relative — which is under attack. 
Provided one does not regard the Pyrrhonian sceptics as presup-
posing (even implicitly) epistemological internalism, one can thus 
see the exegetical difficulties surrounding the coherence of a scepti-
cal ethical stance dissipate because such sceptics are not now com-
mitted to the widespread absence of knowledge, at least in this brute 
'externalise sense, only to the incoherence of any cicarn to possess it.40 
So although the Pyrrhonian sceptic is committed to undermining the 
dogmatic stance of claiming knowledge, he is not thereby commit-
ted to regarding himself as lacking knowledge, at least not the sort of 
knowledge that the ex ternalist is content to allow to be deserving of 
the name. 
In a very real sense, then, Pyrrhonian scepticism can, on this view 
at least, be regarded (in contrast to the atheism of Cartesian scepti-
cism), as truly agnostic about knowledge possession, and what could 
be more non-dogmatic than that? It is important to note that the 
contention here is not that the Pyrrhonians were closet externalists, 
which would, in any case, be both superfluous to the core contention 
of this paper and highly implausible. Rather, the claim is that the 
Pyrrhonian sceptical strategy is consistent with both sides of the inter-
nalism/externalism distinction (which is what you would expect frám 
a non-dogmatic form of scepticism), and therefore cannot be under-
mined simply by rejecting an essential component of either episte-
mological camp. Accordingly, advancing epistemological external-
ism would not directly excuse you from serious consideration of a 
Pyrrhonian sceptical argument in the manner that it would a Carte-
sian sceptical argument. It is in this sense, then, that Pyrrhonian 
scepticism poses a more pressing sceptical challenge than its Carte-
sian counterpart. 
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4. Pyrrhonian Scepticism and the Contemporary 
`Metaepistemologicar Challenge 
What makes Pyrrhonian scepticism particularly intriguing on this in-
terpretation is that it seems to be able to encapsulate certain con-
temporary worries that have been expressed about the anti-sceptical 
efficacy of externalism. Sure, the objection might run, we may well 
(externalistically) know lots of things, but of what use is this sort of 
knowledge to us unless we can reflectively determine that we have 
it and therefore properly claim to possess it? This type of sceptical 
worry has been labelled by Richard Fumerton as `Metaepistemolog-
ical Scepticism', since it is directed at epistemological views (espe-
cially externalist epistemological views) which, at least by their own 
lights, are actually inconsistent with radical scepticism. 41 For whilst 
it may well be true that externalism is inconsistent with the sceptical 
contention (on a priori grounds), that knowledge is, in the main, im-
possible, the issue remains as to whether one's endorsement of this 
externalist reorientation of one's concepts is itself warranied, or at 
least an intellectually satisfying mammuyre to make in response to 
scepticism. 
Part of the problem of expressing this concern, however, is to de-
velop it in such a way that it does not simply beg the question against 
the externalist anti-sceptic. That is, we do not simply want to dismiss 
externalist anti-sceptical accounts on the grounds that they are not 
internalist anti-sceptical theories of knowledge. Consider, for exam-
ple, the following quotation from Fumerton: 
[T]he main problem with extemalist accounts, it seems to me, just 
is the fact that such accounts I-..]  develop concepts of knowledge 
that are philosophically irrelevant. E... ] The philosopher doesn't just 
want true beliefs, or even reliably produced beliefs, or beliefs caused 
by the facts that makes them true. The philosopher wants to have 
the relevant features of the world directly before consciousness. 42 
What is problematic about this quotation is the last phrase that the 
"philosopher wants to have the relevant features of the world directly 
before consciousness". After all, if this is simply the demand that 
an appropriate anti-sceptical philosophy should incorporate reflec- 
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tive access to the factors which make it such that the agent knows, 
then it is simply a demand for intemalism. 
Similar concerns beset other attempts to formulate this metaepis-
temological worry. Consider the following remarks by Barry Stroud: 
[...1 suppose there are truths about the world and the human condi-
tion which link human perceptual states and cognitive mechanisms 
with further states of knowledge and reasonable belief, and which 
imply that human beings acquire their beliefs about the physical 
world through the operation of belief-forming mechanisms which 
are on the whole reliable in the sense of giving them mostly true 
 
beliefs. [... 
 I  If there are truths of this kind, although no one has 
discovered them yet, that fact alone obviously will do us no good as 
theorists who want to understand human knowledge in this philo-
sophical way. At the very least we must believe some such truths; 
their merely being true would not be enough to give us any illumi-
nation or satisfaction. But our merely happening to believe them 
would not be enough either. We seek understanding of certain as-
pects of the human condition, so we seek more than just a set of 
beliefs about it; we want to know or have good reasons for thinking 
that what we believe about it is true. 43 
Again, one might object to this characterisation of the difficulty on 
the grounds that what Stroud is demanding when he speak of 'un-
derstanding human knowledge philosophically' is nothing less than 
some sort of reflective access to the fact that one does indeed have 
the knowledge that one takes oneself to have, and thus an internalist 
epistemology. 44 
The advantage that the construal of Pyrrhonian scepticism of-
fered here holds is that we can by-pass these concerns and never-
theless capture the metaepistemological worry implicit in these quo-
tations. For what is accepted by both parties to the dispute is that 
the propriety of claims to know — and thus of any dogmatic form of 
assent — can be dependent upon reflectively accessible grounds. It 
thus follows that one could formulate the metaepistemological scep-
tical concern along Pyrrhonian lines in terms of an inability to ("dog-
matically") properly claim knowledge — regardless of whether or not 
that knowledge is actually possessed. Moreover, this demand does 
not beg the question against the extemalist since this condition on 
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the propriety of claims to know is one that, we might legitimately 
assume, the extemalist would himself share. The issue would thus 
not be the standard first-order concern about knowledge possession 
(although, on the internalist account, it would translate into that), 
but rather whether or not one could properly claim one's putative 
knowledge; whether one could adopt the "dogmatic" stance of as-
senting to/accepting propositions which one is under no compulsion 
to believe or assent to. 
It is not hard to see how such a challenge would function. Con-
sider the 'regress' element of Agrippa's trilemma that demands that a 
new assertion must be made ad infinitum to support a claim to know. 
The externalist could respond to the epistemological regress principle 
that underlies this argument by simply contending that there are no 
a priori reasons for thinking that such ultimate grounds do not exist 
and thus that the appearance of a regress is illusory. But that would 
be beside the point. For any claim to know must itself be supported, 
and if, as the trilemma suggests, each legitimate claim to know must 
always give way to another legitimate claim to know, then this regress 
will, prima facie at least, still stand. After all, whichever 'foundation' 
the externalist offered would itself be subject to the trilemma, and so 
a regress would loom even here. The externalist would thus have to 
meet a more specific sceptical challenge which was not directed at 
knowledge possession in the 'brute' sense, but merely at any claim to 
have knowledge; any form of dogmatic assent. 
Even on an externalist account, then, although it may be that 
knowledge is rescued from the Cartesian sceptic and everyday con-
versational practices are left intact even by Pyrrhonian lights, what 
is really at issue in the sceptical debate — the ability to dogmati-
cally claim knowledge; to understand knowledge 'philosophically' as 
Fumerton and Stroud might be tempted to put it — is still left moot 
whilst the Pyrrhonian sceptical challenge remains to be neutralised. 
It would thus appear that Pynhonian scepticism should be given a 
re-examination outside of the internalist paradigm in order to see 
whether it has anything important to tell us about the inadequacy 
of extemalist responses to scepticism. 45 It may be that, on an exter-
nalist account, there is no a priori reason to believe that one lacks 
knowledge of most of what one believes. This would be of little use, 
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however, if it still remained that there was an a priori reason to be-
lieve that one is unable to properly claim a substantive portion of 
that knowledge, and it could be that it is Pyrrhonian scepticism that 
is able to capture this latter type of `metaepistemological' sceptical 
worry. 46  
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